









Persistence in Minkowski Space-Time

Under the eternalist hypothesis that objects or events exist temporally but independently of being present two different views of persistence are on the market: Persisting objects endure if they are multiply located in (space-)time, and persisting objects perdure if they are singly located by having numerically different temporal parts. In the framework of the special theory of relativity (SR) the metaphysics of persistence is confronted with peculiar difficulties. Things persist by being “wholly present” at more than one time; but what are times within a temporally non-separated spacetime? Things persist by having different temporal parts at different times; but what are the temporal parts of a four-dimensional object in Minkowski spacetime? Recently, several authors have argued that SR favours perdurantism over its endurantist rival. In the following, I want to show that the purported arguments are only those against endurantism. The first simply fails, but the second, more convincing one, is such that with a similar strategy we should argue against perdurantism as well: Enduring and perduring entities are hence both in conflict with SR which undermines the eternalist hypothesis. 
In particular, the purported arguments fail due to a misleading revival of the spatial analogy​[1]​: Concerning spatially extended objects Yuri Balashov resorts to the spatial analogy by considering the four-dimensional perduring worm underlying the three-dimensional spatial shapes in the same way as three-dimensional objects in space stand behind their perspectival two-dimensional appearances. Then, Cody Gilmore, Ian Gibson and Oliver Pooley consider every three-dimensional subregion of the four-dimensional worm, in virtue of being “matter-filled”, being parts in the perdurantist sense. Like every arbitrary two-dimensional slice through a three-dimensional, spatial object could be considered a spatial part, every arbitrary three-dimensional subregion within a four-dimensional spacetime worm is conceived of as a spatiotemporal part. But perdurantists have to distinguished, in the pre-relativistic context, temporal parts from spatial parts, and so have to identify, in the relativistic context, which spatiotemporal parts could be characterized as temporal parts.
The crucial difference between the underlying eternalist hypothesis and the block-universe view is never taken seriously, which is the reason where the spatial analogy comes from. According to Putnam (1967) the block-universe is conceived of as a timeless entity, in the sense that existence and parthood are non-relative to times​[2]​. According to eternalism in the sense of the new tenseless theory of time (see Mellor, 1998), however, the world is a tenseless but not a timeless entity​[3]​. Existence and parthood are non-relative to the present but tenselessly relative to times. So, the perduring object is misleadingly conceived of as “atemporally confined to their locations in spacetime” (Balashov, 2005, 15; italics mine), and perdurantism is misleadingly conceived of as the “doctrine of arbitrary spatiotemporal parts” (Gibson/Pooley, 2006, 162; italics mine), considering perdurantist parthood as non-relative to times.

Persistence of spatially extended objects

For the details, consider the following situation: Take a four-dimensional space-time worm in Minkowski space-time that represents (the history of) a persisting spatially extended object. Within a family F of parallel simultaneity slices, there is, say, a certain moment of time tF0 at which the considered object changes instantaneously from being spatially wholly red to being spatially wholly green. So, intuitively, each plane of simultaneity parallel to and ‘below’ tF0 is wholly red, and each plane of simultaneity parallel to, but ‘above’ tF0, is wholly green. Now, consider another family of parallel simultaneity slices of a distinct frame F*. Then each tF*i overlaps with each tFj. So, relative to that frame the instantaneous transition from wholly red to wholly green becomes continuous, i.e., it has duration: There are several moments of time at which the object is spatially partly red and partly green. We could say that what is a purely temporal change in one frame is partly a spatial variation relative to another. Temporal change thus seems to assimilate to spatial variation. Intuitively, this assimilation of temporal change and spatial variation suggests a perdurantist view of persistence since, as it is said, according to perdurantism persistence in time is analogous to extension in space​[4]​. Moreover, Balashov (2000a) and Gilmore (2006) attempt to show that perdurantism is favoured by SR not only intuitively, but for sound a posteriori reasons.

1.	The argument from “explanatory deficiency” in Balashov (2000a)

The first argument by Balashov is from an alleged endurantist explanatory deficiency. Perdurantism, Balashov argues, can explain how the three-dimensional frame-dependent shapes ‘fill up’ the four-dimensional worm; in this sense, then, endurantism is explanatory deficient vis-à-vis perdurantism. Given that an endurantist denies that there is any invariant four-dimensional object but only a multi-located three-dimensional object with a variety of different three-dimensional shapes, it seems to be unexplainable for the endurantist why these shapes “arrange themselves into a ‘nice’ 4D volume [...] without ‘corrugation’ and ‘dents’” (Balashov, 2000a, 334). According to the perdurantist conception, in contrast, there is a “pre-existing ontological entity, the 4D perduring pole“ (Balashov, 2000a, 333)​[5]​, that “objectively stand[s] behind all [its] 3D parts“ (Balashov, 2000a, 334). A perdurantist is not confronted, like the endurantist, with “‘separate and loose‘ 3D shapes“ (op.cit.), that arrange, mysteriously, to the four-dimensional unity. It is for the perdurantist “the invariant 4D shape of this volume that generates the whole multitude of 3D shapes” (Balashov, 2000a, 333), while “[i]n the end, the endurantist must regard the infinite variety of perspectival relations as brute facts, with no unifying ground behind them“ (Balashov, 2000a, 338). These claims, I think, are questionable in more than one respect.
But before reviewing Balashov’s argument, we take a look at the considerations by Miller (2004) and Gibson/Pooley (2006). They argue against Balashov that the endurantist has in fact an explanation of the “nice” 4D-volume given that there are “various causal facts about an enduring object O at time t, [that] make it the case that O will exist at t*” (Miller, 2004, 367). The theory of relativity, it is alleged, together with other laws of nature, allows us to predict how objects wholly present at one spacetime region will exist at another. According to Gibson/Pooley (see 2006, sec. 6), Miller indeed overlooks some difficulty in the relativistic case, but, they think, if we conceived of the spatially extended objects as composed of constituent particles, local physics ensures that the worldlines of these particles are closely associated into a smooth volume. In short, Miller and Gibson/Pooley offer a physical explanation of how the variety of three-dimensional shapes fixes a smooth four-dimensional volume. But, in my opinion, Balashov does not deny that such a physical explanation could be available also for the endurantist. Physical explanations are rather independent of the endurance/perdurance-distinction; in the same way one could actually start with a variety of three-dimensional spatiotemporal parts in order to explain the invariant 4D shape of the perduring object. Balashov is rather after an ontological explanation; from an ontological point of view, Balashov thinks, the physical explanation given independently of the nature of persistence seems to be a mysteriously brute fact for the endurantists. For, according to them, there is no “invariant 4D shape”, no “pre-existing 4D pole” but only 3D shapes that are, from an ontological point of view, “separate and loose”, although related by physical laws. But, as I want to argue, this ontological picture is misleading, and it is so due to the misleading spatial analogy.
The misleading spatial analogy comes in different ways: On the one hand, and with respect to the perdurantist, Balashov thinks that the four-dimensional object underlies the three-dimensional spatial shapes in the same way as three-dimensional objects in space stand behind their perspectival two-dimensional appearances. The perduring object is conceived of as having an “invariant 4D shape” which is, in my opinion, at least irrelevant. The four-dimensional object has rather properties at times. It is, for example, red at each time until t1 and green at each time later than t1. Of course, being red at t1 and being green at t2, for the perduring object is to have a temporal part at t1 that is simpliciter​[6]​ red and to have a different temporal part at t2 that is simpliciter green. But from this it does not follow that the perduring object has properties simpliciter in the sense that it is, as a whole, ‘multicoloured’. It is irrelevant that the perduring object could have “an invariant 4D shape”, because the difference to endurantism could already be spelled out allowing for the perduring object only properties at times. Since, in contrast to endurantism, those properties nor are conceived of as time-indexed (like according to indexicalism), nor as being had in a time-indexed way (like according to adverbialism). The perduring whole has non-time-indexed properties, at times; and it has them not t-ly but simpliciter by means of its temporal parts. Balashov, however, and Miller and Gibson/Pooley agree on that, holds the 4D worm as being an object that has an invariant 4D shape, from which generate the various 3D shapes​[7]​.
Secondly, and conversely, it is unclear why for the endurantists the spatial shapes may appear “separate and loose“. From an ontological point of view, given that there is no “invariant 4D shape” in neither case, one could argue that it is rather for the perdurantist that the spatial shapes appear “separate and loose“, for, at least at first view, they still are properties of numerically different three-dimensional entities, e.g., the perdurantist is confronted with qualitatively and numerically different temporal parts that arrange themselves, “mysteriously” without further criteria, to the four-dimensional whole. Independently of being endurantists or perdurantists we are namely not looking at spacetime from the ‘helicopter-perspective’, from a four-dimensional vantage point, from which all of spacetime is ‘given at once’ and from which the four-dimensional whole could be “objectively” grasped. From a reference point in spacetime, however, the endurantists do not have to reduce any multiplicity, as Balashov erroneously thinks (see 2000a, 338), since for her the different time-indexed spatial shapes represent only qualitatively different objects but numerically one and same object that is multiply located in spacetime. From an ontological point of view, identity seems lost for the perdurantists and not for the endurantists. Balashov, as it seems to me, does not take seriously the endurantist conception of multi-location in spacetime: Although a particular cannot be multiply located in space, according to endurantism, it can be multiply located in time – whether the moment of time is classically absolute or relativistically frame-dependent. That is precisely what the difference between space and time consists in, for the endurantists. Of course, in SR spatial shapes vary from frame to frame – something could be spatially wholly red as well as spatially partly red and partly green –, but this, prima facie, makes the conception of multiple localization only intuitively more complicated. Balashov does not show why there could be special paradoxes of multi-location in relativistic space-times.
So, Balashov’s argument from “explanatory deficiency” against endurantism fails, at least in the first instance.

2.	The problem of criss-crossing hyperplanes in Gilmore (2006)

But by now also Gilmore (see 2006) argues in favour of perdurantism, referring to Balashov’s approach concerning spatially extended objects​[8]​. In fact, there is, according to Gilmore, a crucial difference between multi-location in classical absolute time and multi-location in relativistic space-time. 
The problem, roughly stated, is this: Suppose that an object is “wholly present” at one time (or, within one region of space-time). The endurantist, then, must require certain conditions being satisfied for assigning other times (or, other space-time regions) to that same object. For example, already in the pre-relativistic case, one would want to require that an object endures continuously, i.e., without time-gaps. Further, in SR, one might demand that a three-dimensional object should ‘fill up’ a flat region. Whatever other conditions we want to require, the continuous succession of three-dimensional entities along a classical time-axis should satisfy them all if we do not want to exclude endurantism from the beginning. But, Gilmore asks, what about two flat planes of simultaneity associated with two different frames of reference? What about criss-crossing hyperplanes? Is it possible that they are occupied by a twofold instantiated object although no causal relation holds between the contents of such planes?
Before reviewing this argument let us say something about the criterion of flatness: Gilmore (see 2006, sec. 4.1) requires for the three-dimensional enduring object (and for the three-dimensional parts of a perduring one) only “maximal achronal” hypersurfaces that need not to be flat, and also Gibson/Pooley (2006) stress several times that flatness is not needed. Flat hyperplanes, it is argued, in general are not available, even not in our own spacetime that is curved. But according to the eternalist hypothesis, existence and parthood are related to times (i.e., B-times, of course), and therefore temporal parts, in particular, should be conceived of as those spatiotemporal parts that are, somehow, related to times. If, as possibly in our own spacetime, there is a cosmic time, the non-flat spacelike hypersurfaces are related to times, but in Minkowski spacetime they are not. Indeed, one might argue that, nevertheless, a set of non-flat hypersurfaces, in virtue of them being achronal, may constitute a sequence of timelike related entities: But this does not imply that they are temporally separated​[9]​. From a temporal perspective it seems to be incomprehensible that such an entity like a non-flat achronal hypersurface in Minkowski spacetime could be absolutely earlier than another one, if neither of them is related to any time. The persisting entity in fact exists, according to the neutral sense of persistence, at more than one time, it exists hence, within our relativistic context, successively from time to time in frame F and successively from time to time in frame F*​[10]​, but it never exists within a non-flat subregion, non-related to any time. Therefore, who is willing to consider an enduring object exactly occupying non-flat achronal regions of spacetime, or, alternatively, a perduring object having (spatio-)temporal parts within those regions, explicitly confounds the tenseless eternalist world with the timeless block-universe. Concerning this point, we hence follow Balashov​[11]​. 
Gilmore, then, argues that it is a necessary condition for an enduring object being wholly present at different spacetime regions that there holds a causal relation between the contents of such regions​[12]​. Put that way, there is no problem for the endurantist in the pre-relativistic case: For the continuous series along a classical time-axis evidently can be considered a causal chain. In SR, however, the spatial shapes do not only change from time to time, but vary also from frame to frame, so that there are always flat spacelike subregions of every space-time worm that overlap. But two such overlapping subregions, two criss-crossing hyperplanes, Gilmore claims, cannot be “exactly occupied” by O since no causal relation holds between their contents​[13]​. Consider (in our example) the object spatially wholly red on one plane of simultaneity (within the boundaries P-Q) and spatially partly red and partly green at a criss-crossing hyperplane (P’-Q’), such that its red part lies ‘below’ and the green part lies ‘above’ P-Q (see, analogously, Gilmore, 2006, Fig.5). Then, no point within the green part of P’-Q’ lies in the past light-cone of any point of P-Q, and, contrariwise, no point within one part of P-Q lies in the past light-cone of any point of P’-Q’. Superluminal velocities and backward causation aside, it follows that neither the state of P-Q is caused by the state of P’-Q’, nor the converse – in contradiction to Gilmore’s requirement. Thus, the frame-dependency of spatial shapes apparently offers insuperable difficulties for the endurantists​[14]​.
	In my opinion, however, this is not either a convincing strategy for favouring perdurantism. For the following reason: According to traditional perdurantism, an extended object does not only have (familiar) spatial parts but also (quite unfamiliar) temporal parts that must be distinguished, somehow, from its spatial parts. So, the question to be answered by the perdurantists is, how exactly a temporal part can be distinguished from a spatial part. Regarding the relativistic case, the question is, not discussed by Gilmore, how exactly the spacetime worm could reasonably be divided into parts, so that temporal parts are recovered​[15]​. It would again be an instance of being caught in the spatial-analogy if one simply argued that every three-dimensional subregion of the four-dimensional worm were, in virtue of being “matter-filled”, occupied by a temporal part in the perdurantist sense. For although every arbitrary two-dimensional slice through a three-dimensional object in classical space could indeed be considered a spatial part – all within a spatial object is itself spatial –, timelike sections of worldlines, for example, or curved spacelike surfaces within the four-dimensional whole represent neither temporal nor spatial parts of the persisting thing​[16]​, and so the perdurantist is confronted with an analogous difficulty: A necessary condition, among others, for two different spacetime regions being occupied by two different temporal parts of the same object seems to be that a causal relation holds between their contents.
Already Lewis (1976) pointed out that certain conditions must hold between two candidates for being two temporal parts of the same perduring object. Plainly, temporal parts are numerically distinct by definition and, additionally, qualitatively different in the case of changing objects. What, then, might two temporal parts have in common for them to count as parts of one and the same object? According to Lewis, a certain relation must hold between any such two temporal parts, not identity, as the endurantists would have it, but something similar, called “I-relation“ by Lewis. Common to both conceptions is the idea that the relevant relation, at least inter alia, expresses a causal relationship. In Sider’s words:

“[A] sequence of temporal parts counts as a continuant only if that sequence falls under a causal law”. (Sider, 2001, 227)

Consequently, if no causal relation holds between the contents of two criss-crossing hyperplanes, as Gilmore argues, then these hyperplanes ipso facto cannot represent two numerically distinct temporal parts of the same worm, any more than they could represent a multi-located three-dimensional object. And, where there is no multiple instantiation possible, there can be no I-relation, since there has to be an underlying causal relation in both cases. Thus, if Gilmore is right, the frame-dependency of spatial shapes in SR contradicts endurantism and perdurantism alike.
	From that we might conclude: The eternalist hypothesis is in trouble. Both views of persistence seem to be inadequate for spatiotemporally extended objects in SR. Instead of reformulating the pre-relativistic notions of persistence it seems to be necessary to define a new concept of ‘persistence’, like Gibson/Pooley’s so-called ‘perdurantism’ as the “doctrine of arbitrary spatiotemporal parts”. But, then, the temporal character of persistence is lost and the view of a timeless block-universe seems to be vindicated. Ironically, from this conclusion one might gain a support of presentism in the sense that from now on also the eternalists, in virtue of being interested in real temporal becoming in spacetime, should be revisionary in view of Minkowski’s spacetime thesis.
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^1	  The spatial analogy is taken to mean treating spacetime like space, i.e., as a timeless entity.
^2	  In fact, Putnam has shown, if the argument were valid, that with respect to a given spacetime point p all events located at some p’ or other are realized: The realization-relation R – “pRe”: e is realized with respect to p – is universal. But that means that existence with respect to p is coextensive with “existence simpliciter”, which contradicts the classical eternalist view according to which “existence simpliciter” is temporally restrictable by “existence-at-t”. 
^3	  The crucial point of this theory is that tensed sentences like “it is raining now” are indispensible and untranslatable in tenseless ones. So, there are inevitable sentences that vary in truth-value, not depending on a transitory present, as the A-theorists would have it, but from B-time to B-time. From that follows, in contrast to Putnam, that “existence simpliciter” is temporally restrictable in the following sense: Although it does not vary with time what exists simpliciter, in fact it varies with t what exists at t. So, Tooley is wrong, defending his ‘dynamic’ view of temporal existence, when he describes the eternalist view (similarly to Putnam): “All temporal states of affairs are actual as of all times” (Tooley, 1997, 41; see the reply by Mellor, 1998, 81). 
^4	  At least in the sense that a perduring entity ‘fills up’ time by having parts, like a spatially extended object ‘fills up’ space by having parts. But note that, also according to the eternalist view, the perduring entity has its temporal parts successively – namely ordered by the earlier-later relation. For temporal succession within a B-theory of time, see Williams (1996).  
^5	  “Pre-existing” is, of course, not conceived of as temporal precedence. But, what else could it mean?
^6	  But note: This time, “simpliciter” cannot disjunctively analyzed, as the eternalist would have it, in the sense of, to be or to have something “at some time or other”. For an instantaneous temporal part cannot exist (and cannot have some properties) at a time, since, in principle, it cannot be or have something at another time. Only the perduring whole exists at times and has properties at times – namely derivatively by means of its temporal parts. 
^7	  In other words: A perduring entity exists, according to the neutral sense of persistence (see Lewis, 1986, 220), at more than one time, so, within the relativistic context, at more than one moment of proper time (if available) or at more than one moment of frame-times. Of course, it exists so derivatively, by means of its temporal parts (see Merricks, 1994, 167: “A perduring object […] exists at different times derivatively [...]. An enduring object, by contrast, directly and nonderivatively exists at different times”). But Balashov, Miller and Gibson/Pooley think that the perduring whole exists over and above as a four-dimensional whole – analogous to three-dimensional wholes existing in space.  
^8	  The debate has a second part investigating spatially unextended objects and the problem of their coexistence (see Balashov, 2000b, Gilmore, 2002, and Balashov, 2005). In that context Gilmore argues against Balashov’s favoring perdurantism. 
^9	  The distinction between “timelike” and “spacelike” holds also in Putnam’s block-universe that is nevertheless a timeless world in the sense that existence and parthood are non-relative to times. The elements of a sequence of timelike related entities are ordered by a transitive, anti-symmetric and irreflexive relation. But that could be a non-temporal C-series in McTaggart’s sense, the relation not conceived of as the temporal earlier-later relation. It is thus not obvious that “being timelike related” means “being temporally related”.
^10	  Or by being “wholly present” at each frame-time, or by having temporal parts at those frame-times.
^11	  According to Balashov (2008) those regions are “merely matter-filled” but not exactly occupied by an enduring object – and not occupied by a temporal part of a perduring one, as I want to add.
^12	 “Presumably I am currently in condition A at least in part because I was in condition B yesterday: In other words, my being in condition B yesterday is a cause of my being in condition A today” (Gilmore, 2006, 215).
^13	  “Exact occupation” of a spacetime region is Gilmore’s formally more precise notion analogous to “being wholly present”.
^14	  But see the reply in Gibson/Pooley (2006, sec. 5), according to which it is sufficient for the causal relation to hold only partially.
^15	  As it is said before, perdurantism is not the “doctrine of arbitrary spatiotemporal parts” (Gibson/Pooley, 2006, 162). Gibson and Pooley simply translate “temporal parts” into “spatiotemporal parts”, but that way the temporal character of persistence is lost. But, to repeat, eternalism, i.e., the new B-theory is pretended to be a theory about real time and not about a timeless block-universe.
^16	  Of course, in a certain sense, trivially, everything within the boundaries of a spatiotemporal thing is itself spatiotemporal. But that is not the point: Within the four-dimensional whole some subregions are purely timelike, some are purely spacelike, some flat, some curved, and so on. The perdurantist has to say which parts could be the relativistic analogues of the classical “temporal” parts.  
